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 The Charter and Protection against 
Wrongful Conviction:  
Good, Bad or Irrelevant? 
Christopher Sherrin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last 25 years, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 
has made an admirable contribution to the fairness of Canadian criminal 
law and procedure. It has ensured, for example, that persons under arrest 
have immediate access to free legal advice,2 that the police justify in 
advance intrusions into our homes,3 and that those awaiting trial are not 
left to languish endlessly.4 Whether the Charter has made a similar 
contribution to the accuracy of our criminal adjudicatory process, however, 
is another matter. The Charter has certainly led to the acquittal of a greater 
number of guilty persons, a by-product of enhanced fairness that is 
unfortunate but often justifiable. But has the Charter also led to the acquittal 
of a greater number of innocent persons? The question is surely an 
important one in any evaluation of the Charter’s impact, yet the answer 
is not entirely clear. The Charter has undeniably made some contribution 
to protection against wrongful conviction, but its overall impact is 
debatable. Much Charter litigation has been largely irrelevant. Worse, it is 
arguable that in some ways the Charter has had an adverse impact, 
diverting attention and resources away from defence investigations into 
factual innocence and provoking an embattled reaction by the police 
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1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
2
 R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.) (applying Charter s. 10(b)). 
3
 Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. 
Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.); R. v. Rao, [1984] 
O.J. No. 3180, 12 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1984] S.C.C.A. No. 107, 
[1984] 2 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.) (applying Charter s. 8). 
4
 R. v. Morin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 25, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 (S.C.C.) (applying Charter s. 11(b)). 
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resulting in greater subversion of the rules and practices that do protect 
against wrongful conviction. The evidence is fairly sparse, but it is 
plausible that at least at the margin there has been a trade-off between 
fairness and accuracy for the innocent. If that is true, the Charter may 
have done more harm than good. 
In this paper, I examine the record of Charter jurisprudence as it relates 
to protection against wrongful conviction. In a single paper, of course,  
it is impossible to examine the record exhaustively, so my analysis is 
necessarily limited and my conclusions somewhat tentative. However,  
I do attempt to address, at a broad level, most of the major areas of criminal 
Charter jurisprudence. I will undoubtedly fail to mention some relevant 
law, but hopefully the analysis will be sufficiently extensive as to justify 
my conclusion that the Charter’s impact on the fight against wrongful 
conviction is not obviously positive. 
In Part II, I start by defining what I mean by wrongful conviction and 
explain how that immediately eliminates from consideration several areas 
of Charter law. In Part III, I examine the areas of Charter jurisprudence 
that can probably be said to have made a substantial, if not unqualified, 
contribution to protection of the innocent.5 In Part IV, I explain how a great 
deal of Charter law has been largely irrelevant to the issue of wrongful 
conviction. I further pursue this theme in Part V by discussing how the 
Charter has not had any significant impact on many of the main factors 
that lead to wrongful conviction. In Part VI, I consider the other side of the 
coin by discussing a couple of ways in which the Charter may have made it 
more difficult for the innocent to avoid conviction. I conclude with a plea 
for better use of the Charter to ensure that it helps more than it hurts. 
                                                                                                            
5
 I should note here that I will not be considering the so-called right of the innocent not to 
be convicted, referred to in a few cases, e.g., R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577,  
at 611 (S.C.C.); R. v. Leipert, [1997] S.C.J. No. 14, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, at 297 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mills, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at 717-18 (S.C.C.). As far as I can see, that “right” has 
never been given any meaning independent of other rights in the Charter. One also cannot forget 
that the Supreme Court has also stated that the Charter “does not imply an entitlement to those rules 
and procedures most likely to result in a finding of innocence”: R. v. Rose, [1998] S.C.J. No. 81, 
[1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, at 317 (S.C.C.). 
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II. WRONGFUL CONVICTION 
There is more than one sense in which a conviction may be wrongful,6 
but in this paper I am only concerned with conviction of the factually 
innocent. By “wrongful conviction”, therefore, I refer to conviction of 
an individual for a criminal offence when either no crime was actually 
committed or the individual was legally and physically uninvolved in it.7 
This definition excludes convictions brought about by illegal or improper 
means but of individuals who actually committed the crime. 
A focus on factual innocence naturally limits the relevance of the 
Charter, which is primarily concerned with procedural fairness. It is 
possible that procedural fairness has resulted in or contributed to factual 
accuracy — that is a question I address here — but a focus on factual 
innocence clearly renders a whole range of Charter jurisprudence irrelevant. 
Substantive Charter review defines and delimits the offences of which a 
person can be convicted,8 but does nothing to protect an innocent person 
from being convicted of them. Review under section 15 of the Charter 
ensures that we are all subject to the equal application of the same laws,9 
but does not distinguish between application to the innocent and to the 
guilty. Charter decisions regarding punishment and sentencing procedure10 
only come into play after a possibly erroneous conviction. For the most 
part, the Charter can only offer protection against wrongful conviction 
to the extent that it impacts on the accumulation, presentation and use of 
evidence. It is that which can and occasionally does lead to the conviction 
of the innocent. 
                                                                                                            
6
 See Clive Walker, “Miscarriages of Justice in Principle and Practice” in Clive Walker & 
Keir Starmer, eds., Miscarriages of Justice: A Review of Justice in Error (Oxford: Blackstone Press, 
1999), c. 2. 
7
 See Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, “Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases” 
(1987) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, at 45. 
8
 For example, R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.);  
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
9
 For example, R. v. M. (C.), [1995] O.J. No. 1432, 98 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.). 
10
 For example, R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.); R. v. Casey, 
[2000] O.J. No. 71, 141 C.C.C. (3d) 506 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 382 
(S.C.C.). 
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III. THE CHARTER’S CONTRIBUTION TO PROTECTION AGAINST 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION 
There are two ways in which the Charter has made a notable 
contribution to protection against wrongful conviction. Both of those 
contributions have to be qualified in one way or another, but the 
qualifications do not completely undermine the contribution. 
The Charter’s most significant contribution has undoubtedly been in 
relation to the law of disclosure. An accused person in Canada now has 
a constitutional right to disclosure of all information in the Crown’s 
possession, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, unless it is privileged or 
clearly irrelevant.11 This is a very significant right for the innocent. Non-
disclosure of relevant evidence has been a very frequent contributor to 
wrongful conviction.12 Recognition of a constitutional right to disclosure of 
such evidence, therefore, has to be recognized as a positive and meaningful 
development. 
Analysis of the Charter’s contribution to protection against wrongful 
conviction, however, has to take into account the fact that the disclosure 
duty did not originate with the Charter. As the Supreme Court of Canada 
has stated, the duty “had already been recognized at common law as a 
component of the accused’s right to a fair trial and to make full answer 
and defence”.13 Indeed, it is possible to read the Court’s seminal judgment 
on the issue, R. v. Stinchcombe,14 as resting largely on common law 
rather than constitutional principles.15 The Charter has undoubtedly 
“reinvigorated” and “developed”16 the disclosure duty and consequently 
made a significant contribution to protecting the innocent. But one might 
legitimately wonder whether a substantial portion of the current law would 
have developed at common law in the absence of the Charter (albeit absent 
some of the remedial powers). 
                                                                                                            
11
 R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.); R. v. Dixon, 
[1998] S.C.J. No. 17, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244 (S.C.C.). 
12
 See Melvyn Green, “Crown Culture and Wrongful Convictions: A Beginning” (2005) 
29 C.R. (6th) 262, at 265: “Every Canadian historical wrongful conviction is attributable, at least in 
part, to the Crown’s failure to provide full disclosure to the defence” [only a slight over-statement]. 
13
 R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.J. No. 75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307, at 336 (S.C.C.).  
14
 [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.). 
15
 The Court never stated that the Charter dictated a change in the disclosure rules. In fact, 
the word “Charter” only appears twice in the judgment, and never in a critical part. 
16
 R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.J. No. 75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307, at 336 and 314 (S.C.C.), 
respectively. 
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The other facet of Charter law that has contributed to protection 
against wrongful conviction is the law relating to reverse onuses and 
presumptions. The Supreme Court has held that section 11(d) of the 
Charter constitutionally entrenches the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden 
of proof in criminal matters.17 This burden of proof long pre-dated the 
Charter, of course, but the courts have used its constitutionalization to 
strike down statutory provisions “that [permit] or [require] a conviction 
in spite of a reasonable doubt as to the existence of one or more of the 
elements of the offence.”18 On the theory that a lower burden of proof is 
more likely to result in conviction of the innocent, elimination of statutory 
provisions that result in a lower burden must have increased protection 
against wrongful conviction. The increase has probably not been enormous. 
Many reverse onuses and presumptions have been upheld, sometimes 
even when they risk conviction in the face of reasonable doubt.19 But, on 
the whole, the impact of the reverse onuses/presumptions Charter law has 
been positive. 
IV. CHARTER RIGHTS AND THE INNOCENT ACCUSED 
In my view, the Charter jurisprudence relating to disclosure and reverse 
onuses/presumptions has probably been the only jurisprudence that can be 
said to have made a substantial contribution to the fight against wrongful 
conviction. Some other Charter developments have had some impact, but 
it has only been minimal. 
1. Right to Make Full Answer and Defence 
The Charter, under sections 7 and 11(d), protects the right to make 
full answer and defence.20 This is an important right for the innocent, as 
any restrictions on the ability to mount a defence can result in erroneous 
conviction. Thus, the right could have made a difference. But close 
analysis suggests that it has not made much of one. 
                                                                                                            
17
 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
18
 R. v. Whyte, [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3, at 16 (S.C.C.). 
19
 See, for example, R. v. Whyte, [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). For a 
comprehensive list of reverse onuses and presumptions upheld under the Charter (usually under s. 1), 
see Eugene Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Canada, 2d ed., looseleaf (Aurora, ON: 
Canada Law Book, 1987), at 31-374. 
20
 R. v. Rose, [1998] S.C.J. No. 81, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262 (S.C.C.). 
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The Charter has been interpreted to protect a right to engage in full 
cross-examination of Crown witnesses.21 Since cross-examination is one 
of the primary tools given to an accused to expose the weaknesses in the 
prosecution’s case, this should be an important right for the innocent. 
And the right has been validated in a number of instances.22 But the 
accused was already endowed with generous rights of cross-examination 
prior to the Charter,23 and it is not clear that such rights are really much 
greater now.24 The Supreme Court has also upheld several limitations on the 
right to cross-examine25 (not all of them inappropriate) and countenanced a 
significant expansion of the use of hearsay evidence.26 Whether, on the 
                                                                                                            
21
 R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at 665 (S.C.C.); R. v. Lyttle, 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 8, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, at 206-207 (S.C.C.). 
22
 For example, R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Shearing, [2002] S.C.J. No. 59, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 33 (S.C.C.); R. v. Wyatt, [1997] B.C.J. No. 781, 
115 C.C.C. (3d) 288 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Duong, [2007] O.J. No. 316, 217 C.C.C. (3d) 143 (Ont. C.A.). 
23
 See, for example, R. v. Anderson, [1938] M.J. No. 2, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 317, at 319-20 
(Man. C.A.):  
Cross-examination is a powerful weapon of defence, and often its sole weapon. The denial 
of full opportunity to sift and probe the witnesses of the opposing side has always been 
regarded with extreme disfavour by British Courts of justice … That full cross-examination 
of an opposite witness should be permitted by the trial Judge is well settled. The Judge may 
check cross-examination if it become irrelevant, or prolix, or insulting, but so long as it may 
fairly be applied to the issue, or touches the credibility of the witness it should not be 
excluded.  
See also R. v. Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at 663 (S.C.C.): “The 
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses is fundamental to providing a fair trial to an accused. This 
is an old and well established principle that is closely linked to the presumption of innocence.” 
24
 The Supreme Court has indicated that the Charter right “should be interpreted in the 
‘broad and generous manner befitting its constitutional status’” — arguably a manner more generous 
than at common law — but it is hard to find many concrete realizations of this ideal. See R. v. Osolin, 
[1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at 665 (S.C.C.), citing R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, at 544 (S.C.C.). 
25
 R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] S.C.J. No. 22, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740 (S.C.C.) (cross-examination 
need not be contemporaneous with the giving of incriminating evidence); R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] S.C.J. 
No. 72, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 (S.C.C.) and R. v. F. (C.C.), [1997] S.C.J. No. 89, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1183 
(S.C.C.) (young witness can sometimes testify by adopting the contents of an earlier videotaped 
statement even if the witness has no memory at the time of trial of the events described in it); R. v. 
Levogiannis, [1993] S.C.J. No. 70, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475 (S.C.C.) (young witness can sometimes 
testify out of court or behind a screen). 
26
 R. v. Khan, [1990] S.C.J. No. 81, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.); R. v. Smith, [1992] 
S.C.J. No. 74, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915 (S.C.C.); R. v. Khelawon, [2006] S.C.J. No. 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787 
(S.C.C.). The Court commented in Khelawon (at 814-15) that  
the constitutional right guaranteed under s. 7 of the Charter is not the right to confront or 
cross-examine adverse witnesses in itself. The adversarial trial process, which includes cross-
examination, is but the means to achieve the end. Trial fairness, as a principle of fundamental 
justice, is the end that must be achieved. Trial fairness embraces more than the rights of the 
accused. While it undoubtedly includes the right to make full answer and defence, the fairness 
of the trial must also be assessed in the light of broader societal concerns ... In the context of 
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whole, the innocent accused is now in a better or worse position is hard 
to say. 
The Supreme Court ruled in R. v. Crawford27 that an accused in a joint 
trial has the right to rely upon his co-accused’s pre-trial silence in order 
to discredit any incriminating testimony offered by the co-accused. This 
right can help the innocent, but it can also hurt them. In a given case, the 
accused who spoke to the police may be guilty and the accused who stayed 
silent may not be. In that situation, the right to rely upon pre-trial silence 
might contribute to conviction of the innocent. It is true, of course, that 
no inference of guilt is to be drawn against the silent accused, but it is 
probably fanciful to believe that it will not be.28 Any beneficial impact 
of Crawford relies upon the assumption that the silent accused is more 
likely to be guilty. I suspect that is true, but absent any clear understanding 
of the relevant statistical probabilities29 it is impossible to state that the 
benefits from Crawford have been substantial. 
The Charter has been interpreted to protect the right of the accused 
to know the case he30 has to meet before he has to respond.31 This right can 
protect the innocent by ensuring that he has an opportunity to respond to 
every aspect of the Crown’s case. But the right is nothing new. The Crown 
has long been prohibited from splitting its case.32 At most, the rules are 
only a little stricter in the Charter era.33 Furthermore, in the main Charter 
                                                                                                            
an admissibility inquiry, society’s interest in having the trial process arrive at the truth is 
one such concern. 
To the extent that hearsay evidence is truly reliable, of course, its admission will not be of 
concern to the innocent. I will refrain, however, from discussing the thorny issue of whether the 
current hearsay rules are adequate to ensure the admission of only truly reliable evidence. 
27
 [1995] S.C.J. No. 30, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 858 (S.C.C.). 
28
 Even the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]he distinction between the use of evidence 
limited to credibility and evidence that can be used to infer guilt is well understood by lawyers but 
may not be easily understood by a jury. It has been criticized as being artificial”: R. v. Crawford, 
[1995] S.C.J. No. 30, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 858, at 883 (S.C.C.). 
29
 As discussed below, there is good reason to believe that innocent suspects usually waive 
the right to silence, but there is also strong evidence that a large percentage of guilty suspects do the 
same. See, text accompanying and included in notes 45-52. The difference, if any, between the 
percentages for innocent and guilty suspects is unknown. 
30
 I employ the masculine pronoun throughout when referring to innocent accused simply 
because the vast majority of the known wrongly convicted are male. I employ the feminine pronoun 
whenever referring to someone other than an accused or a suspect. 
31
 R. v. Rose, [1998] S.C.J. No. 81, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, at 318-19 (S.C.C.). 
32
 See R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.) (citing many  
pre-Charter cases). 
33
 See, for example, R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555, at 575-76 
and 580-81 (S.C.C.) (narrowing the authority of its earlier decision in R. v. Robillard, [1978] S.C.J. 
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case in which the right was sought to be actualized, R. v. Rose,34 the 
Supreme Court ruled against the accused, holding that he has no right to 
always address the jury last. I am not certain that addressing a jury first 
necessarily prejudices an accused, but Rose certainly does not suggest 
that the Charter has made things better for the accused. 
The Supreme Court in R. v. Seaboyer held that it violated section 7 
to exclude from trial defence evidence, not otherwise subject to an 
exclusionary rule, unless its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect.35 A generous admissibility rule regarding defence 
evidence certainly has the potential to protect the innocent, but in Seaboyer 
the Supreme Court actually restricted the rule of admissibility, by 
recognizing a discretion to exclude defence evidence that did not exist at 
common law.36 Of course, the Charter was responsible for the power 
exercised in Seaboyer to strike down legislation that ran afoul of the new 
admissibility rule, and to that extent the Charter may have contributed to 
protection of the innocent. But as far as I know Seaboyer has never been 
used to strike down legislation again, so the Charter’s contribution has been 
minimal.37 
It is difficult to come to a final assessment of the value to the innocent 
of the constitutional right to make full answer and defence. The right is 
a broad one of diverse application. There have certainly been isolated 
instances where it has proven to be valuable.38 But looking at the record 
as a whole it is not obvious that it has been of great benefit. It has 
undoubtedly helped a little, but probably only a little. 
                                                                                                            
No. 31, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 728 (S.C.C.), on the assumption that it could (but really should not) be 
interpreted in a way that offends the Charter). 
34
 [1998] S.C.J. No. 81, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262 (S.C.C.). 
35
 R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 611 (S.C.C.). 
36
 David M. Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (Concord, ON: Irwin Law, 
2005), at 35-36. 
37
 Perhaps of greater promise is the suggestion of the Ontario Court of Appeal that a trial 
judge can, in some circumstances, allow an accused “to tender certain evidence that might be technically 
inadmissible, as a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for an 
abuse of process or to ensure a fair trial”: R. v. Felderhof, [2003] O.J. No. 4819, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 498, 
at 532 (Ont. C.A.). It is too early to tell whether this suggestion will be actualized in a way that is 
truly beneficial to the innocent, or whether it extends much beyond the common law power, cited in 
Felderhof, to “relax in favour of the accused a strict rule of evidence where it is necessary to prevent a 
miscarriage of justice and where the danger against which an exclusionary rule aims to safeguard 
does not exist”: R. v. Williams, [1985] O.J. No. 2489, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 356, at 378 (Ont. C.A.). 
38
 See, for example, R. v. Roy, [1994] N.S.J. No. 82, 31 C.R. (4th) 388 (N.S. Prov. Ct.) 
(proceedings stayed against deaf mute who could not understand the proceedings or properly instruct 
counsel). The result in Roy is rather exceptional, however: see, for example, R. v. Morrissey, [2003] 
O.J. No. 3961, 177 C.C.C. (3d) 428 (Ont. S.C.J.), affd [2007] O.J. No. 4340, 87 O.R. (3d) 481  
(Ont. C.A.); R. v. H. (L.J.), [1997] M.J. No. 450, 120 C.C.C. (3d) 88 (Man. C.A.).  
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2. Excluding Prejudicial Evidence 
Another rule coming out of the Seaboyer case was the rule that a 
trial judge has the power to exclude Crown evidence in circumstances 
where its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.39 This 
principle does not protect the right to make full answer and defence, but 
it probably protects against wrongful conviction by protecting against 
the risk that an accused will be convicted based on something other than 
evidence actually proving his guilt. The holding in Seaboyer was important 
because it put to rest the more restrictive rule in R. v. Wray40 that a judge 
could only exclude Crown evidence if its probative value was trifling and 
its prejudicial effect grave. But it would be dangerous to attribute this 
change to the Charter. In her decision in Seaboyer, McLachlin J. (as she 
then was) did not say the Charter required her to overrule Wray. On the 
contrary, she relied on the fact that the common law had been developing 
a different approach since Wray.41 The decision is admittedly ambiguous, 
but the better view is that Seaboyer reflects an evolution of the common 
law, which may now be constitutionalized. The Seaboyer rule had been 
recognized in the Supreme Court before the Charter,42 and some members 
of the Court had acknowledged after the Charter came into effect that 
the common law endowed a judge with the Seaboyer discretion.43 As the 
Court itself noted in R. v. Buhay, “even in the absence of a Charter breach, 
judges have a discretion at common law to exclude evidence … if the 
prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence outweighs its probative value.”44 
3. Right to Silence 
Section 7 of the Charter has been interpreted to include a right to 
silence. False confessions are a surprisingly frequent contributor to 
                                                                                                            
39
 R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 610-11 (S.C.C.). 
40
 [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, [1971] S.C.R. 272 (S.C.C.). 
41
 R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 609-11 (S.C.C.). 
42
 R. v. Sweitzer, [1982] S.C.J. No. 48, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 949 (S.C.C.). 
43
 See R. v. Corbett, [1988] S.C.J. No. 40, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, at 739-40 and 697 
(S.C.C.), per La Forest J. and Dickson C.J.C., respectively; R. v. Potvin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 24, 
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, at 531-32 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J.; Thomson Newspapers Corp. v. Canada 
(Director of Investigation and Research), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at 559-60 
(S.C.C.), per La Forest J. 
44
 [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at 650 (S.C.C.). 
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wrongful convictions,45 so a constitutional right not to speak to the 
authorities could help the innocent by allowing them to hide behind a 
protected veil of silence. But the reality is that the right is probably of little 
assistance. In the large majority of cases the innocent will waive the right, 
eager to convey their exculpatory story to investigators.46 There has yet 
to be an empirical study analyzing the practices of the factually innocent 
in interrogations, but the suggestion that they will speak has obvious 
intuitive appeal and has proven true in numerous Canadian47 and 
American48 wrongful convictions. The suggestion has also been confirmed 
in a laboratory experiment showing that the innocent are most likely to 
waive their right to remain silent.49 If the innocent almost always speak, 
the right to stay silent is of little significance to them. 
A recent re-analysis of the right to silence argued that the right 
indirectly protects the innocent, not because it will encourage them not 
to speak, but because it will encourage the guilty not to speak. Triers of 
fact will then accord the statements of those who do speak more credence, 
on the assumption that silence is indicative of guilt (i.e., of having 
                                                                                                            
45
 Samuel Gross et al., “Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003” (2005) 95 
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 523, at 544-46; Steven Drizin & Richard Leo, “The Problem of False 
Confessions in the Post-DNA World” (2004) N.C. L. Rev. 891. 
46
 See Jeremy Bentham, A Treatise on Judicial Evidence (Littleton, Co.: Fred B. Rothman 
& Co., 1981), at 241:  
Let us now consider the case of persons who are innocently accused. Can it be supposed that 
the rule in question [the right to silence] has been established with the intention of protecting 
them? They are the only persons to whom it can never be useful. Take an individual of this 
class … What is his highest interest, and his most ardent wish? To dissipate the cloud which 
surrounds his conduct, and give every explanation which may set it in its true light; to 
provoke questions, to answer them, and to defy his accusers. This is his object; this is the 
desire which animates him … If all the criminals of every class had assembled, and framed 
a system after their own wishes, is not this rule the very first which they would have 
established for their security? Innocence never takes advantage of it; innocence claims the 
right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence. 
47
 See, e.g., The Inquiry regarding Thomas Sophonow: the investigation, prosecution and 
consideration of entitlement to compensation (Winnipeg: Manitoba Justice, 2001), at c. 2; Commission 
on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin: Report, vol. 2 (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 1998), at 786-96, 847-52, and 997-99; The Lamer Commission of Inquiry Pertaining to  
the Cases of Ronald Dalton, Gregory Parsons, Randy Druken: Report and Annexes (St. John’s, 
Newfoundland: Ministry of Justice, 2006), at 77 and 183-84 (regarding Parsons and Druken, 
respectively). 
48
 Richard Leo et al., “Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards 
in the Twenty-First Century” [2006] Wis. L. Rev. 479, at 497-98; Paul Cassell, “Protecting the 
Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions — And from Miranda” (1998) 88 J. Crim. L. 
& Criminology 497, at 539-40. 
49
 Saul Kassin & Rebecca Norwick, “Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of 
Innocence” (2004) 28 Law & Hum. Behav. 211 (finding that 81 per cent of innocent suspects 
compared to 36 per cent of guilty suspects waived their right to silence). 
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something to hide).50 Interesting as this argument is, it incorrectly 
assumes that the people who waive the right to silence will distinguish 
themselves from the bulk of suspects as a group deserving of especially 
favourable consideration. The large majority of suspects (80 to 90 per cent) 
waive the right.51 Triers of fact are unlikely to believe that 80 to 90 per 
cent of suspects are innocent and consequently accord the suspects who 
talk more charitable consideration. Instead, they will simply assume that 
many guilty people waive their right to silence and that waiver says nothing 
about innocence.52 
The right to silence also fails to protect against wrongful conviction 
because it fails to offer any meaningful protection against interrogation 
tactics that might prompt false confessions. The right to silence does not 
really regulate police questioning. That role is left to the common law 
voluntariness rule.53 The role of the right to silence is limited to 
protecting a person’s right to choose whether to respond to questions.54 
Even then it does not do a very good job. A person can repeatedly invoke 
his right to silence and still be questioned for hours, with the police doing 
everything they can to change his choice.55 Capitulation in the face of such 
                                                                                                            
50
 Daniel Seidmann & Alex Stein, “The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege” (2000) 114 Harv. L. Rev. 430. 
51
 In a survey of American interrogations, Richard Leo found that only about 20 per cent of 
suspects remained silent: “Inside the Interrogation Room” (1996) 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 266. 
Other studies have reported even lower numbers: Paul Cassell & Bret Hayman, “Police Interrogation 
in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda” (1996) 43 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 839 
(reporting that only 12.1 per cent of suspects invoked their Miranda rights); Paul Softley,  
Police Interrogation: An Observational Study in Four Police Stations (London: H.M.S.O., 1980) 
(reporting that only 9 per cent of suspects refused to answer some or all questions during interrogation); 
Roger Leng, “The Right to Silence in Police Interrogation: A Study of Some of the Issues 
Underlying the Debate”, Royal Commission of Criminal Justice Research Study 10 (London: 
HMSO, 1993) (reporting that only 4.5 per cent of suspects exercised their right to silence). 
52
 See Stephanos Bibas, “The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty” (2002-2003) 
88 Iowa L. Rev. 421. As Bibas says (at 430), “in a world where 80% to 90% of suspects talk, talk is 
cheap. Some guilty suspects choose to remain silent, but many more talk, mimicking innocent 
defendants and so leading juries and police to distrust all alibis.” 
53
 See R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48 (S.C.C.). Certain aspects of the voluntariness rule 
may now be constitutionalized under Charter s. 7, but the Supreme Court has made it clear that the 
latter does not subsume the former: R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at 25 (S.C.C.). 
54
 R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, at 176 (S.C.C.): “Section 7 confers 
on the detained person the right to choose whether to speak to the authorities or to remain silent.” 
55
 “Police persuasion, short of denying the suspect the right to choose or depriving him of 
an operating mind, does not breach the right to silence”: R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 
2 S.C.R. 151, at 184 (S.C.C.). For illustrations of how this has permitted the police to engage in 
prolonged and sometimes intense questioning, see R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Edmondson, [2005] S.J. No. 256, 196 C.C.C. (3d) 164 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Timm, [1998] J.Q. no 3168, 
131 C.C.C. (3d) 306 (Que. C.A.), affd [1999] S.C.J. No. 65, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 666 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Wood, [1994] N.S.J. No. 542, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (N.S.C.A.). In fairness, the law is not entirely 
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onslaught is far from rare. Until the right to silence is used to regulate 
pernicious police questioning56 it will never really protect against false 
confessions and the wrongful convictions that almost inevitably ensue.57 
4. Right against Self-Incrimination 
A right against self-incrimination has developed under the Charter. 
It has been used to render inadmissible at a criminal trial statutorily 
compelled statements from the accused58 as well as evidence derived 
from statutorily compelled testimony given by the accused in a prior 
proceeding.59 This may have added some protection against wrongful 
conviction, but not much. 
It is far from obvious that statutory compulsion to speak to the 
authorities incites or contributes to false statements of guilt. False 
confessions seem to come about as a result of a critical combination of 
interrogative pressure and suspect vulnerability,60 not legal compulsion 
to speak.61 It is possible that the police will take advantage of a statutory 
compulsion to pressure a suspect into confessing, but the exclusion of 
                                                                                                            
clear as to what constitutes legitimate persuasion, and there are some, mostly lower court, decisions 
that seem to impose some greater limits on acceptable police conduct. See Benissa Yau, “Making 
the Right to Choose to Remain Silent a Meaningful One” (2006) 38 C.R. (6th) 226 and, more 
recently, R. v. Smith, [2007] O.J. No. 963 (Ont. S.C.J.). The Supreme Court in Singh also noted that 
“[i]n some circumstances, the evidence will support a finding that continued questioning by the 
police in the face of the accused’s repeated assertions of the right to silence denied the accused a 
meaningful choice whether to speak or to remain silent”: R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, at para. 53 
(S.C.C.). However, it is fair to say that the police have significant leeway.  
56
 See Welsh White, “Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices” (2001) 
99 Mich. L. Rev. 1211. 
57
 Richard Leo, “False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions” in Saundra 
Westervelt & John Humphrey, eds., Wrongly Convicted: Perspectives on Failed Justice (Piscataway, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001) 36, at 44-46. 
58
 R. v. White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.). White did not actually 
hold that statutorily compelled statements are always inadmissible in criminal trials, but that has 
almost always been the result. See, for example, R. v. DaCosta, [2001] O.J. No. 2392, 156 C.C.C. 
(3d) 520 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Jones, [2002] O.J. No. 2136 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Aziga, [2006] O.J. No. 5232 
(Ont. S.C.J.). For a rare exception, see R. v. Barnes, [2007] O.J. No. 1224 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
59
 R. v. S. (R.J.), [1995] S.C.J. No. 10, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451 (S.C.C.); British Columbia 
(Securities Commission) v. Branch, [1995] S.C.J. No. 32, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
60
 In some cases one or the other may suffice. See Christopher Sherrin, “False Confessions 
and Admissions in Canadian Law” (2005) 30 Queen’s L.J. 601; Richard Leo & Richard Ofshe, “The 
Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action” (1997) 74 Denv. U.L. Rev. 979.  
61
 The Supreme Court in White suggested that legal compulsion could lead to false 
confessions, but the case law has actually focused on false statements of innocence: see R. v. White, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 445-46 (S.C.C.); R. v. Zwicker, [2003] N.S.J. No. 496, 
186 C.C.C. (3d) 395, at 405-406 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 54, 187 
C.C.C. (3d) vi (S.C.C.).  
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compelled statements will only protect against wrongful conviction to the 
extent that, absent the statutory compulsion, the police would not have 
applied equivalent pressure in a traditional interrogation (and thereby 
received the same sort of statement) — an unlikely scenario. The police 
are more likely to get statements in the face of statutory compulsion, and 
even a truthful statement might harm an innocent accused if the prosecution 
uses it to plug holes in its case and/or cross-examine the accused, which 
might lead to conviction. But statutorily compelled statements are only 
occasionally relevant to criminal proceedings so the added protection 
given by the Charter is probably small.62 
Exclusion of evidence derived from compelled testimony offers about 
as much protection against wrongful conviction. The innocent will only 
be protected if the derivative evidence is falsely incriminating. In most 
cases, however, the fact that evidence is derivative will say nothing about 
the likelihood that it will point to the wrong suspect. Probably the only 
scenario where there might be a connection is where an innocent suspect 
compelled to testify identifies the real, but previously unknown, perpetrator 
and that person responds by falsely and convincingly implicating the 
innocent suspect. That may happen from time to time, but surely not 
frequently. 
5. Search and Seizure 
Section 8 merits only brief mention, and only because it has received 
so much attention over the past 25 years.63 Section 8 regulates access to 
events transpiring in, and items and information stored in, private locations. 
It is hard to fathom how the regulation of access protects the innocent 
from conviction. The evidence sought by the police exists independently 
of them and is neither created nor changed by being accessed.64 The 
                                                                                                            
62
 The Charter does, of course, prevent the government from creating new statutory compulsions 
specifically for use in the criminal context, but common law traditions have long done the same thing. 
63
 See Daniel Givelber, “Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably 
Acquit the Innocent?” (1996-1997) 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 1317, at 1378: “The rules regarding search 
and seizure … do little for the actually innocent defendant.” 
64
 The only exception to this that I can contemplate is when s. 8 is applied to police 
questioning, as in R. v. Mellenthin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 100, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615 (S.C.C.). In theory, 
answers to such questions could be affected by the form and manner of questioning. But the vast 
majority of police questioning is not regulated by s. 8. It only seems to apply when the police have 
formed the intention to conduct a physical search and questions are asked in relation to that 
upcoming physical search. See R. v. Grant, [2006] O.J. No. 2174, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250, at 264-65 
(Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal allowed [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 99 (S.C.C.). Such questions are highly 
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evidence can certainly be misinterpreted, altered, concealed, destroyed, 
etc. — all of which can contribute to wrongful conviction. But all those 
misuses occur after the evidence has been accessed and thus after the 
applicability of section 8 has largely been exhausted.65 One could argue 
that the Charter protects against misuse prophylactically by restricting 
access to the evidence in the first place, but the connection between the 
Charter and the wrongful conviction that otherwise may ensue from the 
misuse seems rather remote. Regulating search and seizure could really 
only protect reliability to the extent that it prevented a corrupt investigator 
from planting evidence, by restricting the investigator’s ability to get 
inside the location where the evidence would be planted. But if the 
investigator is so corrupt the reality is that a warrant or other similar 
requirement will probably do little to thwart her plot. She will simply 
fabricate the necessary evidence to justify access. 
6. Arbitrary Detention 
Section 9 seems similarly unimportant. It protects the innocent from 
harassment and unreasonable interference with liberty, but not from 
conviction. Section 9 would only be significant if the arbitrariness of an 
arrest or detention somehow generated evidence that could result in 
wrongful conviction. Evidence can be discovered during the course of an 
arbitrary arrest or detention, of course, but it would not normally be created 
by it. Detained individuals may make false confessions or admissions, 
but there is no evidence that such statements come about as a result of 
the arbitrariness of a detention.66 The only way in which section 9 might 
protect against wrongful conviction is by ensuring a person was given a 
prompt opportunity for release. Release would minimize contact with the 
authorities (who might be pressuring the person to confess) and allow 
                                                                                                            
unlikely to contribute to a wrongful conviction. If, for example, a person falsely states that he has 
narcotics in his gym bag, the subsequent physical search will quickly uncover the truth. 
65
 To the extent that s. 8 regulates private information after it has been accessed, it often 
(although not always) only regulates further access to it. See, for example, R. v. Arp, [1998] S.C.J. 
No. 82, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.); R. v. Dore, [2002] O.J. No. 2845, 166 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.). 
66
 There is no evidence that a randomly chosen suspect is more likely to falsely confess 
than a suspect chosen for good reason. In fact, if anything, a randomly chosen suspect is probably 
less likely to falsely confess. It is only when the choice of suspect is not random that there will be 
some evidence that seems to implicate the suspect and that gives the police reason to believe in his 
guilt and pressure him to confess. 
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the person to quickly begin to gather evidence in his defence.67 But the 
common law and the Criminal Code68 already limited the time period in 
which the police could keep a suspect within their exclusive control.69 
The Charter has not added much to the limitations. In fact, the Supreme 
Court once interpreted section 9 to permit a delay of over 18 hours 
before the accused was given an opportunity for release (specifically so 
that the police could continue their investigation).70 
7. Section 10(a) 
Section 10(a) of the Charter guarantees a person under arrest or 
detention the right to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor. One of 
the purposes of the right is to “enable the person under arrest or detention 
to immediately undertake his or her defence”.71 Since, as a general rule, 
a valid defence prepared sooner is more likely to succeed, this right 
undoubtedly provides some protection against wrongful conviction. But 
one must ask whether it really provides anything new. Both the common 
law and the Criminal Code72 had already dictated that persons under arrest 
be advised of the reason for it.73 The Charter case law has not really 
added anything. Indeed, one could argue that section 10(a) has proven to 
be a rather weak right. In several cases the courts have ruled that persons 
                                                                                                            
67
 A person under detention will often have some opportunity to gather evidence, but the 
task is usually more difficult from behind bars. 
68
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
69
 Very generally, the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 provides (and similarly provided 
in 1982) that a police officer should not arrest someone unless it is necessary, should release 
someone from custody as soon as possible after an arrest, and otherwise must bring an accused 
before a justice “without unreasonable delay” (a phrase that has been interpreted strictly) and at 
least within 24 hours, unless a justice is not available within that time: Criminal Code, ss. 495-499, 
503; R. v. W. (E.), [2002] N.J. No. 226, 168 C.C.C. (3d) 38 (Nfld. C.A.); R. v. Koszulap, [1974] 
O.J. No. 726, 20 C.C.C. (2d) 193 (Ont. C.A.). At common law, if a police officer detained someone 
for too long it could be held to constitute an arrest: see Roger Salhany, Canadian Criminal Procedure, 
3d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1978), at 29. 
70
 R. v. Storrey, [1990] S.C.J. No. 12, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.). 
71
 R. v. Evans, [1991] S.C.J. No. 31, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 869, at 875 (S.C.C.). 
72
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
73
 Christie v. Leachinsky, [1947] A.C. 573 (H.L.); R. v. Evans, [1991] S.C.J. No. 31, 
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 869, at 875 (S.C.C.), per Sopinka J.; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 29(2). 
It is less clear that a person under detention had the right at common law to be advised of the reason 
for it, but if a detention turned into or amounted to an arrest the accused would be no worse off in 
terms of his ability to undertake his defence. A person detained, released, and then later arrested 
may be in a better position now, although the legal obligation to inform a person of the reason for his 
detention did exist under s. 2(c) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1985, App. III (albeit with 
less teeth than under the Charter). 
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under arrest did not have to be informed of the specifics of the offence 
for which they were arrested.74 Although in each of those cases it is 
probably fair to say that the accused already knew the specifics, decisions 
condoning the use of generalized information in order to comply with 
section 10(a) carry the risk that an innocent person, truly ignorant of the 
specifics of the allegation, will not be able to immediately undertake his 
defence. 
8. Right to Counsel 
A great deal of Charter litigation has considered the content of the 
right to counsel under section 10(b). A person under arrest now clearly 
has the right to consult with counsel of choice, in private and without cost, 
immediately upon arrest or detention.75 The authorities are prohibited 
from trying to elicit incriminating information until the person has had a 
reasonable opportunity to consult counsel,76 and are also prohibited from 
unfairly undermining or denigrating any advice given by counsel.77 
Access to a lawyer right after being confronted with a false accusation 
of criminal conduct will undoubtedly be of comfort to the innocent but it 
will probably only protect them from later conviction to the extent that it 
enables immediate preparation of a defence. One of the main functions of 
counsel at this stage is to inform the suspect of his right to remain silent,78 
yet we have already seen that such information is of little significance to 
the innocent. Counsel can also advise the suspect concerning participation 
in any other investigative activities, such as provision of biological samples, 
but it is not those sorts of activities that have led to wrongful conviction.79 
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 R. v. Jackson, [2005] A.J. No. 1726, 204 C.C.C. (3d) 127, at 135 (Alta. C.A.) (“The appellant 
was advised that he was under arrest for murder as required under s. 10(a). He has not shown that 
he must be provided with the circumstances of the offence, including the identity of the deceased, 
in order to satisfy s. 10(a)”); R. v. Wong, [1998] B.C.J. No. 858, 52 C.R.R. (2d) 89 (B.C.C.A.) 
(police did not have to inform arrestee of the specific illegal narcotic he was alleged to have possessed);  
R. v. B. (C.), [1995] O.J. No. 2303 (Ont. Prov. Div.) (police did not have to inform arrestee of the 
nature of the stolen property which he was alleged to have possessed). 
75
 R. v. Bartle, [1994] S.C.J. No. 74, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pavel, [1989] O.J. 
No. 2307, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 296 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Jackson, [1993] O.J. No. 2511, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 233 
(Ont. C.A.). 
76
 R. v. Manninen, [1987] S.C.J. No. 41, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233 (S.C.C.). 
77
 R. v. Burlingham, [1995] S.C.J. No. 39, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.). 
78
 R. v. Brydges, [1990] S.C.J. No. 8, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, at 206 (S.C.C.). 
79
 Participation in biased lineups has contributed to wrongful conviction, but it is the 
lineup bias and not the accused’s participation that is the problem and defence counsel have no 
control over how a lineup is conducted. Furthermore, an accused’s refusal to participate in a lineup 
can have adverse consequences: R. v. Ross, [1989] S.C.J. No. 2, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3, at 14 (S.C.C.). 
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Indeed, they have often led to exoneration.80 Miscarriages of justice are 
often the result of improper or biased police investigations, but defence 
counsel has no formal power to direct or influence the course of an 
investigation or to prevent it from going off course.81 Defence counsel 
can really only offer meaningful protection against wrongful conviction 
to the extent that she can effectively respond to the Crown’s case and 
discover and develop the opposing case for the accused. This requires 
that the accused be given (a) access to trial counsel, and (b) access to 
competent trial counsel. The Charter has not really guaranteed the accused 
either. 
The major impediment to obtaining counsel is normally financial. In 
most regions of the country an accused person can usually find a lawyer 
willing to take on his case, but the cost can be daunting. The Charter does 
not really solve that problem. There is no general constitutional right to 
state-funded counsel.82 An accused person is expected to bear the costs 
of his own defence if he can. If he cannot, the applicable legal aid plan 
will provide assistance in the vast majority of cases, at least where the 
accused faces any prospect of imprisonment.83 Legal aid plans largely 
pre-date the Charter and do not owe their existence to it. For the most part, 
therefore, access to trial counsel is not granted or even addressed by the 
Charter.84 The only exception is where legal aid has been refused, the 
                                                                                                            
“The most obvious consequence … is that the accused at trial might find that he cannot effectively 
complain about a less satisfactory method of witness identification such as by showing witnesses 
photographs of the accused taken from a police book of ‘mug-shots’”: R. v. Parsons, [1993] O.J. 
No. 1937, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 226, at 232 (Ont. C.A.). The trier of fact cannot normally draw an inference of 
guilt from refusal to participate in a lineup, unless a person takes extraordinary steps to avoid 
participating: R. v. Shortreed, [1990] O.J. No. 145, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 292 (Ont. C.A.); Parsons, ibid. 
80
 Barry Scheck, “Barry Scheck Lectures on Wrongful Convictions” (2006) 54 Drake  
L. Rev. 597, at 601: “Since 1989, when the FBI began doing DNA testing … [in] twenty-six 
percent of the cases where the FBI got results, the primary suspect was excluded.” 
81
 Indeed, it is unclear that the police even have to speak to defence counsel during the 
initial stages of an investigation: see R. v. Fitzsimmon, [2006] O.J. No. 5079, 216 C.C.C. (3d) 141 
(Ont. C.A.). It would be hard for defence counsel to influence an investigation if she could not 
obtain information about it. 
82
 New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. 
No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at 96 (S.C.C.). 
83
 I do not mean to minimize the problems faced by unfunded accused not at risk of 
imprisonment, but they are not always left to their own devices. State-funded legal clinics will 
sometimes provide assistance. In any event, Charter relief is unlikely to be provided in such minor 
cases. See, for example, R. v. Sechon, [1995] J.Q. no 918, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 554, at 560-61 (Que. C.A.). 
84
 Legal aid also provides counsel at bail hearings, helping to secure an accused person’s 
release, which as stated above can be important for the innocent. The Charter right to counsel has 
not had much impact on access to counsel at bail hearings, except insofar as an accused may benefit 
from any early preparation for a bail hearing undertaken by private counsel contacted after arrest. 
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accused is truly impecunious, and representation by counsel is essential 
to a fair trial. In that situation, the trial judge has the power under the 
Charter to stay the proceedings until the necessary funding for counsel 
is provided.85 Thus, the Charter only steps in to fill the gap in access to 
counsel in “exceptional” cases.86 Arguably, the Charter grants the accused 
no greater right than he had at common law.87 The Charter right is also 
quite limited. The accused does not necessarily have access to counsel 
of choice and the courts have little if any power to supervise the level of 
funding afforded to counsel.88 The accused basically has to accept the 
terms set by the funding agency, except in the exceedingly rare situation 
where he cannot find competent counsel to represent him on those terms.89 
In any event, a right of access to trial counsel, no matter how broad, 
is of little use to the innocent (or the guilty) if it does not include a right 
of access to competent counsel. A bad lawyer is unlikely to prevent  
a wrongful conviction. Indeed, bad defence lawyering can contribute to 
wrongful conviction.90 The Charter cannot really be said to have protected 
against wrongful conviction, therefore, unless it has ensured competence. 
It is doubtful that it has. Nominally, an accused person has a constitutional 
right to effective assistance from counsel.91 In reality, however, the courts 
have probably set the bar too low to ensure quality representation. Claims 
on appeal of ineffective representation at trial do not usually succeed.92 
Counsel benefits from a strong presumption that her conduct was 
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reasonable93 and appeal courts have been reluctant to criticize counsel’s 
strategic and tactical decisions.94 The American standard for reviewing 
counsel’s conduct set out in Strickland v. Washington,95 and largely adopted 
by the Supreme Court of Canada, has been criticized for providing little 
to no protection against wrongful conviction.96 After reviewing the relevant 
Canadian case law, Dale Ives concluded that “the right to effective 
assistance of counsel does not itself ensure in any significant way that 
accused persons will receive competent representation.”97 This is not to 
say that the Charter is a toothless tiger in this area. Appellate review  
of defence counsel’s performance will presumably catch some of the 
problems, and the mere possibility of review will motivate some otherwise 
poor counsel to do a competent job (although the impact will be mitigated 
by the low standard of review and the unpredictability of outcome). But 
the Charter has probably not done much to ensure that innocent accused 
are not prejudiced by their own counsel. By not guaranteeing adequate 
funding for counsel’s time and disbursements, the Charter has also failed to 
ensure that counsel are always even capable of mounting an effective 
defence. 
9. Trial within a Reasonable Time 
The right to a trial within a reasonable time has as one of its purposes 
the protection of the innocent. As the Supreme Court noted in R. v. Askov,98 
time can work against the wrongly accused: he can lose important evidence 
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in his favour as memories fade, documents are lost and witnesses disappear. 
Section 11(b) seeks “to ensure that proceedings take place while evidence 
is available and fresh”99 and thus could, in theory, provide significant 
protection against wrongful conviction.100 The problem is that matters have 
not really worked out that way. Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision 
in R. v. Morin,101 a section 11(b) application is highly unlikely to succeed.102 
It is still possible that the Charter right will protect an innocent accused, 
particularly if he can prove that the delay adversely impacted his ability 
to make full answer and defence,103 but by sometimes countenancing 
delays of years104 the courts have interpreted section 11(b) in a way that 
significantly reduces its prospects for protecting against the loss of 
evidence. 
It is also well arguable that section 11(b) does not even address the 
most relevant delays for innocent accused.105 The more relevant delays 
are probably those that occur prior to charge and prior to disclosure after 
a charge is laid. Once notified of a specific allegation, an accused has 
some ability to obtain and preserve evidence in his favour. Even if a 
relevant witness dies or otherwise becomes unavailable, the accused can 
still seek to introduce the witness’s evidence as an exception to the 
hearsay rule.106 I do not mean to minimize the problems that extensive 
delay can bring, but if promptly notified of an allegation of wrongdoing 
an accused at least has a fair chance of finding and holding on to proof of 
his innocence. An accused does not have that chance if he is not notified 
of the allegation and its details promptly after its alleged occurrence, such 
as when a charge is laid many years after the event or when a charge is 
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laid more promptly but disclosure of the purportedly incriminating evidence 
is not given with similar alacrity. Unfortunately, the Charter currently 
allows for this to occur. An accused charged with an historic offence can 
apply for a remedy under sections 7 and 11(d) but he must establish that 
he cannot have a fair trial as a result of the pre-charge delay.107 Lengthy 
pre-charge delay alone does not establish a Charter violation.108 And the 
remedy for prejudicial pre-charge delay is a stay of proceedings, which 
is only to be granted in the clearest of cases, a difficult burden for an 
accused to overcome.109 The situation is more optimistic in relation to 
disclosure, but still of some concern. The Supreme Court has stated that 
disclosure must be made “early enough to leave the accused adequate 
time to take any steps he … is expected to take that affect or may affect” 
his right to make full answer and defence.110 Yet, in complex cases it is not 
uncommon for delays of months to occur, and courts have countenanced 
delays that are much longer, sometimes extending beyond the preliminary 
inquiry.111 If prejudiced, the accused can usually obtain an adjournment, 
but time is of little assistance when the exculpatory evidence is permanently 
lost. In those circumstances, an innocent accused must seek a more 
substantial remedy, such as exclusion of the Crown evidence to which 
the lost evidence relates or a stay of proceedings. I have already noted 
that the latter remedy is difficult to obtain.112 A lesser remedy will be 
granted more readily but only if the accused establishes a reasonable 
possibility that his ability to defend himself was impaired.113 Perhaps 
that is not an onerous burden, but it does prejudice the innocent accused 
who, through no fault of his own, cannot prove what he lost. 
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10. Jury Selection 
A major issue in criminal procedure over the past couple of decades 
has been jury selection. An accused now has a greater ability to challenge 
prospective jurors for cause than he did before the Charter, particularly 
in relation to challenges based on the accused’s race.114 Although the 
beneficial impact of expanded challenges for cause is open to debate,  
at least in theory it could contribute to protection of the innocent by 
helping to ensure impartiality. But legal developments in this area have 
not really been attributable to the Charter. Chief Justice McLachlin spoke 
in R. v. Williams115 of the need to interpret the pertinent Criminal Code116 
sections in light of the Charter, but the Charter seems to have had only a 
modest impact on the actual outcome of cases.117 The seminal case of  
R. v. Parks118 did not even mention the Charter. Expanded rights  
to challenge for cause are really attributable to the impact, on the 
interpretation of long-standing Criminal Code provisions regulating jury 
selection, of growing evidence and acknowledgment of the pervasiveness 
of racial prejudice.119 The only way in which the Charter can be said to 
have made a real contribution to the fight against wrongful conviction is in 
striking down the right of the Crown to stand aside prospective jurors.120 
11. Bail 
Section 11(e) of the Charter has been used to strike down a couple 
of extremely broad grounds for denying bail pending trial.121 In theory, 
this may have contributed to protection against wrongful conviction since 
it is generally harder to mount an effective defence while confined in a 
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detention facility. But the impact of section 11(e) has probably been 
minimal. Many of the same considerations used to deny bail under the 
impugned provisions are still employed by the courts.122 The Charter 
would have only been beneficial to the extent that innocent accused would 
have been detained because of considerations no longer in use. The 
prospect is possible but hardly likely. 
12. Exclusion of Evidence 
Irrespective of whether the content of any Charter right protects 
against wrongful conviction, it might be argued that merely having rights 
protects the innocent by giving them added legal avenues for excluding 
seemingly incriminating prosecution evidence. There is some truth to 
that, but it seems strange to attribute the added protection to the Charter. 
The protection comes not strictly from having the constitutional right, 
but from having the police violate it. The Charter helps by being ignored. 
The protection is entirely fortuitous and can be eliminated simply by the 
police obeying the law. The jurisprudence under section 24(2) also does 
not focus on the “(un)reliability” of evidence in determining whether it 
ought to be excluded.123 Reliability is a factor,124 but hardly a prominent 
one. I suppose one must say that the possibility of excluding evidence 
has made some contribution to the fight against wrongful conviction, 
but it is a random one, not directed or always available to the innocent. 
V. THE CHARTER’S IMPACT ON THE FACTORS THAT  
LEAD TO WRONGFUL CONVICTION 
This brief review has undoubtedly failed to do justice to the vast 
array of Charter rulings made over the years. It is possible that more of 
them have contributed to protection of the innocent.125 But apart from 
the law relating to disclosure and reverse onuses/presumptions, it is hard 
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to discern any major developments that have had a significant beneficial 
impact. The Charter seems to have been largely irrelevant. Further support 
for this conclusion comes from a review of the Charter’s impact on the 
main documented causes of wrongful conviction.126 The impact has been 
minimal indeed. 
Eyewitness misidentification is generally regarded as the leading 
contributor to wrongful conviction.127 The simple reality is that eyewitnesses 
can be mistaken in their identification of a perpetrator, especially when 
the latter is a stranger and the encounter is brief. Misidentifications are 
usually made because of problems with the eyewitness’s perception or 
recollection of the perpetrator and/or problems with the post-offence 
identification process that lead the eyewitness to identify an innocent 
suspect.128 In other words, eyewitnesses make mistakes because at the 
time of the event they fail (for whatever reason) to adequately or accurately 
perceive the perpetrator, because after the event they forget in whole or 
in part what they observed, and/or because the lineup or other identification 
procedure used is biased, suggestive or otherwise misleading.129 
The Charter cannot solve the problem of eyewitness misidentification, 
of course; people will always make mistakes. But the Charter could have 
some role to play. It could be used to exclude eyewitness testimony that 
is insufficiently reliable, to exclude eyewitness evidence that is tainted 
by unreliable identification procedures employed by the police, and/or 
to grant an accused the right to call expert evidence on the frailties of 
eyewitness testimony.130 Charter claims of this sort have been rare  
and almost always unsuccessful. The courts have generally held that  
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the reliability of eyewitness testimony goes only to weight, not to 
admissibility;131 the exceptions have been few.132 A few courts have 
allowed for the possibility of excluding eyewitness evidence tainted by 
problematic identification procedures,133 but I know of no case where the 
evidence was actually excluded.134 The courts have yet to consider  
the admissibility of expert evidence in this area on Charter grounds, but the 
current state of the common law is that such evidence is not admissible.135 
The Charter cannot be said to have made any significant contribution to 
solving the problem of mistaken identifications. 
Jailhouse informant testimony is another notorious contributor to 
wrongful conviction. Such informants tend to prevaricate both frequently 
and convincingly136 and they have contributed to numerous wrongful 
convictions in the past.137 Attempts to use the Charter to exclude jailhouse 
informant testimony as a category of evidence, however, have failed.138 
A court is neither obliged nor empowered to review the quality of an 
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informant’s testimony before admitting it.139 Crown Attorney’s offices 
often vet informants for reliability before calling them as witnesses,140 
but there is no legal obligation on the Crown to do so. The only real 
assistance given to an innocent accused by the Charter in this context  
is the right to disclosure of information relating to the informant’s 
credibility.141 That is not an insignificant right, but it is just a 
particularization of the point previously made that the Charter has (along 
with the common law) contributed to protection against wrongful 
conviction through the law of disclosure. 
Erroneous or improperly used scientific evidence has also contributed 
to wrongful convictions in the past.142 In recent years the courts have 
increasingly begun to grapple with the difficult problem of regulating 
scientific evidence and they have now assumed a moderately robust 
gatekeeping role.143 This at least has the potential to keep out unreliable 
evidence and thereby protect against wrongful conviction. However, this 
development is not attributable to the Charter. The courts have applied 
their common law, not their constitutional, jurisdiction to screen out 
unreliable evidence. 
Witness perjury is another common contributor to wrongful 
conviction.144 The Charter obviously cannot prevent people from lying, 
but it could prevent them from testifying when their evidence is highly 
suspect and/or regulate the ways in which their evidence is gathered in 
the first place. Neither has occurred. The Supreme Court has ruled that 
the Charter does not endow a trial judge with the power to exclude 
evidence on the basis that it is unreliable (except evidence traditionally 
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subjected to judicial review, such as confession or hearsay evidence).145 
Accused persons have occasionally sought Charter relief for police 
investigatory misconduct that might have tainted a witness’s testimony,146 
but few rulings have been made in their favour.147 Certainly, no body of 
law has developed that has attempted to regulate police-witness interactions 
that might result in perjured or unreliable testimony.148 The courts have 
really only responded to extreme cases.149 
Prosecutorial misconduct also contributes to wrongful conviction.150 
Misconduct can come in many forms, including suppression of exculpatory 
evidence, unreasonable exercises of discretion (brought about by tunnel 
vision),151 improper cross-examination, inflammatory jury addresses, 
interference with the neutral administration of justice, and so forth. The 
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Charter has helped combat suppression of evidence, as discussed above 
in connection with disclosure, but otherwise has not had much impact. 
The courts have been very reluctant to use the Charter to regulate the 
exercise of Crown discretion152 and have resorted to common law and 
statutory means to address other forms of prosecutorial misconduct.153  
It is obviously dangerous to generalize, and resort has certainly sometimes 
been made to the Charter,154 but in most cases a remedy has been 
unavailable.155 The Charter also does not appear to have deterred 
prosecutorial misconduct, given how often it has grounded successful 
appeals over the last 25 years.156 
VI. HAS THE CHARTER CONTRIBUTED TO  
CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT? 
The discussion to this point may have been neither surprising nor 
disconcerting. The Charter was not really designed to be an instrument 
for the effective protection of the innocent, and maybe we should not be 
concerned if has not turned out to be. But we must be concerned if the 
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Charter has somehow contributed to conviction of the innocent. It is 
possible that it has. 
I have two concerns, neither of which I can conclusively substantiate 
but both of which I believe are realistic. My first concern is that the 
possibility of Charter relief may have diverted scarce defence time and 
resources away from the investigation and preparation of factual defences.157 
My second concern is that the increased and often confusing regulation of 
police activities that has come with the Charter has provoked a hostile 
reaction from the authorities leading to greater disrespect for and subversion 
of rules and practices generally, including those rules and practices that 
do protect against wrongful conviction. 
1. Legal versus Factual Defences 
Counsel do not usually have unlimited time and resources to spend 
defending a case. On the contrary, time and money are usually in short 
supply, especially if the client is funded by legal aid. This obviously makes 
the job of defence counsel much harder. She must attempt to provide an 
adequate defence without the means or opportunity to do it. Some counsel 
will go the extra mile to provide that defence, even to the point of working 
for free and covering some of the costs, but financial and logistical realities 
will frequently limit the ability to do so. Not only do counsel have to earn a 
living, they also have to devote time and resources to other clients. The 
result of this practical reality is that in almost any given case choices 
will have to be made, and in some cases a choice will have to be made 
between defences to pursue (with any real vigour). There simply will not 
be enough time and money to pursue them all. Presumably, the choice 
will be based heavily on the perceived merits of the various defences. 
But merit will not always be the only consideration. A busy defence lawyer 
will also have to (or at least often will) take into consideration the time 
and expense required to investigate and litigate a defence. 
The problem with the Charter is that it often provides counsel with 
the option of pursuing a constitutional defence that, in general, is likely 
to be easier and cheaper than a factual defence. This may work out well for 
the guilty, but not so well for the innocent whose best shot at an acquittal 
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(not to mention exoneration) often lies in a factual defence. William 
Stuntz has explained the problem well: 
Consider the relative cost of raising a search and seizure claim and  
a self-defense argument. The search and seizure claim has many 
advantages. Such claims are easy to raise … The facts on which they 
rest usually do not involve much independent digging by defense counsel. 
The typical suppression hearing is nothing more than an adjudication 
of the plausibility and legality of the police officer’s version of events. 
This adjudicative process requires neither detailed papers nor a 
complicated jury proceeding ... And the benefits of a successful claim 
are sometimes enormous — it can mean dismissal of all charges. ... 
The self-defense claim, meanwhile, will likely involve substantial digging. 
Among other things, counsel will have to investigate in detail any prior 
relationship between the victim and the defendant, since that relationship 
will tend to determine the plausibility of any claim that the victim was 
the true aggressor. It is also costlier to pursue than the Fourth Amendment 
claim. If the government fights the suppression motion, the upshot is  
a brief suppression hearing; if the government fights a self-defense 
argument, the upshot is a jury trial, and jury trials are more involved 
and require more preparation than suppression hearings. And the self-
defense claim is generically no more likely to succeed ...158 
Stuntz properly acknowledges that defence counsel have other 
motivations besides minimizing cost, but he also correctly points out 
that counsel are only rarely in a position to choose between consitutional 
and factual defences. 
The far more common choice is whether to file the motion or investigate 
the factual claim. Factual arguments are not merely harder to prepare 
and pursue than legal claims; they are harder to evaluate. ... [F]actual 
arguments — claims that the defendant did not do the crime, or acted 
in self-defense, or lacked the requisite mens rea — tend to require 
nontrivial investigation simply to establish whether there is any argument 
to make. Most possible challenges to the legality of a police search, 
meanwhile, appear on the face of the police report ... 
The relevant choice, therefore, is not whether to file a suppression motion 
or make a self-defense argument, but whether to file the motion or find 
out if the argument even exists, in a world where it probably doesn’t. 
Given how cheap is the process that decides the suppression motion, 
and given the expense of both determining whether the self-defense 
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argument is worth making and actually taking that argument to trial, the 
system places substantial pressure on counsel to opt for the procedural 
claim rather than the (potential) substantive one. …159 
As Stuntz also notes,160 the pressures operating to prioritize 
constitutional claims in an individual case operate with added force in the 
context of a busy defence practice. Time spent on one case cannot be spent 
on another, and since it is generally more profitable to defend a bunch of 
short cases than a smaller number of longer cases, counsel are pressured 
to minimize the amount of time they spend on each individual case. 
Stuntz’s example of a search and seizure versus a self-defence 
argument may not be the best one; not too many cases will present that 
choice. But many cases will present a choice of the sort that Stuntz 
describes. Over 80 charges can often be defended by right to counsel or 
evidence to the contrary arguments. Drug possession charges can raise 
section 8 issues as well as mens rea issues concerning knowledge (of the 
presence of the substance or of its illicit character). Personal violence 
offences can sometimes be litigated based on unreasonable search and 
seizure or on the fallibility of the forensic analysis of the items seized. In 
each case, the Charter argument is likely to be the easier and cheaper one. 
Stuntz was writing in an American context but there is little reason 
to believe that the same pressures to prioritize constitutional claims do 
not operate here. Indeed, it is possible that the legal aid systems in at 
least some Canadian provinces exacerbate the problem. In Ontario, for 
example, legal aid funding is weighted in favour of in-court time and 
against preparation time. Counsel defending an importing cocaine case, 
for example, is paid for all her court time but for only a limited amount 
of preparation time.161 That would not be problematic if the number of 
hours paid for preparation was extensive, but sadly it is not. If the importing 
trial lasts one week, counsel is entitled to bill for a maximum of 31 hours 
of preparation time162 (subject to any discretionary increase granted by 
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legal aid).163 That 31 hours has to cover all time spent on seemingly 
unavoidable matters like client meetings,164 adjournments, obtaining and 
reviewing disclosure, travel to and from court, preparation for cross-
examinations and legal arguments, drafting jury addresses, and so forth. 
How much time will be left for the often frustrating and unpleasant task of 
properly investigating and preparing a positive factual defence?165 The 
situation is even worse for what are categorized as less serious charges. 
Defence counsel in a one-day sexual assault trial is paid for about eight 
hours of preparation time.166 Counsel in a two-day summary conviction 
criminal harassment trial is covered for about two hours of preparation 
time.167 In such situations it would hardly be surprising if counsel even 
unconsciously give preference to defences that do not require a lot of 
preparation time, or that require less than alternative defences. Because 
the Charter often presents counsel with a plausible less time-consuming 
defence, it may lead counsel to neglect factual defences in a number of 
instances. 
Most counsel, of course, would not consciously abandon or  
de-emphasize a factual defence simply because it is less profitable, but 
the choice to prefer a constitutional defence will not necessarily appear 
to be unethical. Counsel are obliged to consider Charter defences; indeed, 
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they would be professionally irresponsible if they did not. And Charter 
defences can be quite attractive: they can lead to acquittal. The problem 
is that Charter defences can also fail. This is not a problem for the guilty 
client. He has not lost anything. The Charter defence was simply  
an opportunity for acquittal that he otherwise did not have. But an 
unsuccessful Charter defence is a problem for an innocent client if it 
consumed time and resources that could have been spent developing a 
factual defence. Accused persons and their lawyers often have to make 
tough tactical choices, but the point is that the Charter offers and 
sometimes forces a choice between a legal and a factual defence rather 
than between factual defences. The option to choose or prefer a legal 
defence can often appear to be the best choice to counsel who is mired 
in the routine practice of criminal law where most of her clients are guilty. 
Counsel is apt to develop a strong presumption of guilt in relation to all 
clients168 and consequently a strong presumption that investigation of 
factual defences will be fruitless. Pursuing a Charter defence allows 
counsel to believe (often quite legitimately) that she is doing a better job 
for her client than she would be if she pursued an “obviously pointless” 
factual defence. If we did not have the Charter, ethical counsel would 
not have that option and would be forced to pursue a factual defence no 
matter how unrealistic it might appear to her to be. 
All of the above is somewhat speculative. I cannot prove that 
defence counsel have consciously or unconsciously given preference to 
constitutional defences over factual ones. Even if they have, there would 
not have been a one-to-one displacement of factual for legal defences; 
the effects would presumably have only been felt at the margin. But the 
possibility of displacement of any level is cause for concern. 
2. Increased Police Corruption 
The other cause for concern is the possibility that the Charter has had 
an adverse impact on police behaviour. Police officers are confronted 
with a challenging, unpleasant but nonetheless critically important task. 
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They must tackle large numbers of crimes and do battle with the often 
unethical and sometimes cunning individuals who perpetrate them. It is 
fair to say that many officers consider their task too difficult but their cause 
noble; they are the ones who defend and protect the innocent victims.169 
It is also fair to say that many police officers consider some of the 
limitations on their powers to be unjustified. This attitude has been 
noted by many observers over the years.170 
The Charter, of course, has increased the number and complexity of 
limitations on police powers. One can argue about how dramatic the 
change has been, but it is beyond question that a police officer in 2007 
faces greater constraints than a police officer did in 1982. That may not 
seem like a bad thing to an outside observer, but to at least some police 
officers it has probably appeared to be an inappropriate and unacceptable 
state of affairs. Some officers may have felt hounded by the courts and 
unreasonably handcuffed in their task. They are especially likely to have 
felt that way if the new Charter rules have been unclear, inconsistent, 
and not obviously justifiable — a description that might reasonably be 
applied to some criminal Charter jurisprudence. 
My concern is that officers have reacted to the new constitutional 
constraints by increasingly operating outside of the law — by bending 
legal and institutional rules in order to catch the bad guy (and then 
concealing and denying their behaviour to the outside world).171 Some 
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police officers have always bent the rules to some extent, but the danger 
is that the number of police officers willing to engage in that behaviour, 
and the frequency with which they do so, may have increased along 
with an increase in what they have considered to be inappropriate rules 
limiting their ability to do their job. 
Observers of police behaviour have noted that officers will sometimes 
react to new rules that complicate their task by avoiding or ignoring 
them.172 To the extent that the Charter has added rules that protect the 
innocent, such a reaction, if it has taken place,173 would obviously have 
detracted from the usefulness of those rules. That concerns me, but what 
concerns me more is the prospect that the Charter has affected some 
officers’ views of, and commitment to, the justice system as a whole. 
Reluctance to comply with new beneficial rules would have diminished 
their impact, but wrongful conviction would be no more likely than it 
was before. The risk of wrongful conviction could have increased, 
however, if the Charter has had a ripple effect. Police feeling hemmed in 
by constitutional constraints may have lost respect for legal and institutional 
constraints generally. They may have come to believe, even more than 
before, that they have to take matters into their own hands if they are to 
win the battle against crime. This may not simply have translated into a 
broad (but hidden) reluctance to comply with the Charter; some Charter 
rules cannot easily be avoided, and an officer can never be sure if a  
new rule, or an existing rule that he cannot control, will torpedo his 
investigation. Antagonism towards the Charter may have translated into an 
increased willingness, and even desire, to circumvent legal and institutional 
constraints of all sorts, including those that protect against wrongful 
conviction. 
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There are many ways in which this could have played out. Police 
officers feeling caged in by the Charter may, for example, have increasingly 
violated the common law confessions rule, thereby overcoming 
constitutional limitations by securing powerfully incriminating but false 
confessions and admissions.174 Police officers uncertain of the admissibility 
of evidence they have collected may have felt a greater need to influence 
the evidence of witnesses, urging them to remember who the perpetrator 
“really” was or what he “really” did. Police officers dispirited by legal 
developments may have increasingly turned to unsavoury individuals 
like informants for new “evidence”. 
Many police officers are people of high integrity, of course, but it 
would be naïve to believe that they all are. It would also be wrong to 
assume that a given police officer will necessarily consider a breach of 
the rules to be improper, or at least unjustified. Police officers often set a 
higher value on the apprehension of criminals than on adherence to legal 
“technicalities”.175 Clearly not every police officer would have reacted to 
the Charter in the way I have described. But it seems plausible that some 
of them have. 
Unfortunately, the hypothesis is very difficult to substantiate. There 
is very little information available regarding police officers’ views of or 
reactions to the Charter. One study uncovered some positive attitudes 
towards the Charter, but the finding was not uniform and was based on 
questioning of a very small number of officers.176 Another study showed 
that while the official police response to the Charter was positive, officers 
interviewed felt that it had made investigations more difficult and created 
long-term frustration for some officers; they were also unhappy that some 
old investigative procedures have been disapproved and that some Charter 
rulings had seemed to favour the rights of the accused over the protection 
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of society.177 There is also a body of literature in the United States 
demonstrating that the police there have sometimes reacted negatively 
to increased constitutional constraints, have been willing to violate those 
and other legal constraints, and have believed it was justifiable to do so.178 
It would not be surprising if similar attitudes were found here. None of 
this proves that police in Canada have rebelled against the Charter by 
increased subversion of rules generally, but it does suggest that the police 
may have been motivated to do so. 
Sadly, if police in Canada have reacted in the way I have described it 
may have had (and may continue to have) especially adverse consequences 
for the innocent. All things being equal, a police officer is probably most 
likely to bend the rules in a case where she feels the greatest need to do 
so because strong incriminating evidence against the suspect is lacking. 
Such evidence will usually be lacking against an innocent suspect. Thus, 
an increased willingness to bend the rules may have been operationalized 
with particular frequency in cases where a risk of wrongful conviction 
was present. Of course, one would assume that a police officer would be 
less likely to bend the rules if she was worried that a suspect might be 
innocent, but we cannot assume that police officers have often had doubts 
about guilt when it came to actually innocent suspects. Indeed, in many 
documented wrongful convictions the police felt (and sometimes continue 
to feel) absolutely certain of the suspect’s guilt.179 Furthermore, there is 
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evidence that protestations of innocence by a suspect can actually serve 
to reinforce an officer’s belief in guilt.180 
It is unpleasant to think that police officers are willing to violate 
legal and institutional rules, but the evidence is fairly convincing that 
they sometimes do. Unfortunately, the Charter may have given them added 
reason to do so, a possibility that may have had and continue to have 
unfortunate consequences for the innocent. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have argued that the Charter has made a contribution, 
but probably not a major contribution, to protection against wrongful 
conviction in the Canadian criminal justice system. At the same time,  
I have expressed a concern that the Charter may have also hurt the 
innocent by diverting defence resources away from investigations into 
factual innocence and by provoking an adverse reaction from the police 
leading to a greater willingness to engage in behaviour that increases the 
risk of wrongful conviction. Whether on balance the Charter has helped 
more than it has hurt is hard to say, but it is at least possible that the 
overall impact has been negative. At the very least, this shows that we 
cannot be complacent about the gains we have achieved through the 
Charter. It could also suggest that the Charter should be abolished or its 
interpretation substantially narrowed. I, however, would not go that far. 
The Charter has contributed to the fairness of our criminal justice system 
and, more importantly, it has the potential to be a useful tool in protecting 
against wrongful conviction. Charter-based rules mandating reliable 
identification procedures and videotaped reliable interrogation procedures, 
for example, could go a long way towards protecting the innocent. The 
important task is to use the Charter well. Indeed, increased Charter  
rules designed to safeguard against wrongful conviction could even 
prophylactically solve the problem of defence diversion by turning some 
Charter litigation into accuracy litigation. By ensuring that the authorities 
comply with the Charter, in other words, defence counsel may indirectly 
ensure that some of the conditions leading to wrongful conviction do not 
arise. Even if its impact will not be uniformly positive, the Charter has 
considerable promise. We only have to strive to fulfil it. 
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